risdictions and sectors, clarifying the types of situations in which simplified customer due diligence will be appropriate, as well as those situations where it is necessary for firms to conduct enhanced checks.
We have new rules concerning the extended definition of politically exposed persons -PEPs (here is clarified that enhanced due diligence will always be appropriate where transactions involve politically exposed persons), inclusion of tax crimes as predicate offences, national and Europe-wide risk assessments, reinforcement of sanctioning powers and requirements to co-ordinate cross-border action, lower exemptions for one-off transactions and expansion of the perimeter, new requirements on beneficial ownership information, to increase transparency by requiring companies and trusts to hold information on their beneficial ownership, and to make this 57 ISSN 2239-8023 DOI 10.14612/SICLARI_2_2014 information available to supervisors and parties conducting due diligence on them.
The problem of supervision of payment institutions that operate across borders by agents.
In this new regulatory framework, we have the problem of supervision of payment institutions that operate across borders by agents. In fact most Member States result host some agents operating on a European passport under the EU Payment System Directive (PSD); a large number of Member States act as the home regulator for cross border Payment Institutions.
Risks associated with the Money Transfer sector, especially operating through agents, are considered very high.
For example, in Italy money laundering and financing terrorism risks associated with the Money Transfer sector are considered very high, due also to the size of the Italian money remittance market: amongst the EU countries, the Italian market is the second biggest one in terms of money remittance flows directed abroad (eur 7,39 mld in the 2011). In 2011 the market share of the Money remitters based in another EU country operating in Italy through very extensive networks of agents was equal to 55%.
In this framework, various criminal investigations found out that the money transfer networks are misused for money laundering purposes or for terrorist financing purposes by criminal organizations. Italy is conducting a specific risk assessment of the payment services sector in the broader works undertaken to draft the Italian National Risk Assessment.
In Portugal, PS agents, whenever they are not financial institutions, are considered as presenting an inherent ML/FT high-risk. This is the case due to their absence of control mechanisms in terms of the prevention of AML/CFT on the overwhelming number of agents operating in these conditions (gas stations, subway stations, su-58 ISSN 2239-8023 DOI 10.14612/SICLARI_2_2014 permarkets).
According to FATF's new Recommendation 14 on money or value transfer services providers, MVTS providers should be required to be licensed or registered. MVTS providers should be subject to monitoring for AML/CFT compliance. Agents for MVTS providers should be required to be licensed or registered by a competent authority, or the MVTS provider should be required to maintain a current list of its agents accessible by competent authorities in the countries in which the MVTS provider and its agents operate. According to para. 14.5, MVTS providers that use agents should be required to include them in their AML/CFT programmes and monitor them for compliance with these programmes.
Agents pursuing their activities on the basis of PSD Article 25, regarding the exercise of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services. According to this rule, any authorised payment institution wishing to provide payment services for the first time in a Member State other than its home Member State, in exercise of the right of establishment or the freedom to provide services, shall so inform the competent authorities in its home Member State. Within one month of receiving that information, the competent authorities of the home Member State shall inform the competent authorities of the host Member State of the name and address of the payment institution, the names of those responsible for the management of the branch, its organisational structure and of the kind of payment services it intends to provide in the territory of the host Member State. In order to carry out the controls in respect of the agent, branch or entity to which activities are outsourced of a payment institution located in the territory of another Member State, the competent authorities of the home Member State shall cooperate with the competent authorities of the host Member State. The competent authorities of the home Member State shall notify the competent authorities of the host Member State whenever they intend to carry out an on-site inspection in the territory of the latter. However, if they so wish, the com- 
Some problems arising from the application of the new rules in EU Member
States.
From this new system of rules derive various problems related to the supervision of the money services agents. ties, we will run the serious risk of an asymmetric supervision of agents.
In my opinion, instead we would need -just to avoid reduced competition between the laws of the Member States in the implementation of the new EU Directives -as fast as possible harmonization of procedures for the supervision of payment institutions by agents.
We need a common approach to the regulation of cross border PS agents within Europe at present, to counter the risk of violation domestic law and distortion of competition within a local market because of uncontrolled AML/CFT measures by using a huge network of agents. We need a 'standardised' and uniform approach, so as to consider the justified interests of the PS industry to get predictable regulatory conditions.
